Louisiana Power & Light v. Thibodaux: The Abstention Doctrine Expanded (Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, U.S., 1959) by unknown
LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT v. THIBODAUX: THE
ABSTENTION DOCTRINE EXPANDED*
THE Supreme Court has recently extended beyond its long-standing boun-
daries the area in which federal courts, in deference to initial adjudication by
the state judiciary, are to abstain from deciding cases. Both Court and Con-
gress had previously required such abstention, despite properly invoked federal
jurisdiction, principally in two classes of suits in which the relief sought was
injunction of state action. The first class of cases involved claims for relief
based on the federal constitution, and began with Railroad Conme'n v. Pullan
Co.' in 1941. There, an administrative order based on a doubtful interpretation
of a state statute was challenged as unauthorized by state law and as violative
of the due process, equal protection, and commerce clauses.2 A unanimous
Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Frankfurter, adopted a procedure-fol-
lowed by a host of decisions since 3-for resolving constitutional issues raised
by state laws which are "reasonably open to construction."14 The federal in-
junction suit was stayed, pending a state-court decision of a suit to be brought
by the parties to test the validity of the state action under the applicable state
statute. The federal district court was to retain jurisdiction, -presumably to en-
sure fair and efficient state adjudication 5 and, if necessary, to decide the con-
stitutional issue in the light of state-court interpretation.0 Since state adjudi-
*Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959).
1. 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
2. The Texas Railroad Commission issued an order which in effect required one white
conductor on each sleeping car. The ,Pullman Company, joined as plaintiff by a union
representing colored porters employed on such cars, sought to enjoin the order. Id. at 497-93.
3. See, e.g., Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959) ; City of Meridian v. Southern
Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 358 U.S. 639 (1959) ; AFL v. Watson, 327 U.S. 582 (1946) ; Spector
Motor Serv., Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101 (1944); Chicago v. Fieldcrest Dairies,
Inc., 316 U.S. 168 (1942).
The only nonconstitutional case in which this procedure had been employed prior to
Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959), is Thompson v.
Magnolia Petroleum Co., 309 U.S. 478 (1940), a proceeding in federal bankruptcy court
depending on unclear Illinois property law. The Court asserted that the district court had
"exclusive and nondelegable control" over the suit, but concluded that in the interest of
both parties and of uniformity in applicable law, the unclear statute should receive prior
state court interpretation in a plenary suit. Id. at 483. This case has been followed only
in a few summary bankruptcy proceedings. See Note, 59 CoLum. L. Rnv. 749, 763 & n.93
(1959).
4. See Harrison v. NAACP, 360 US. 167, 176 (1959); Public Util. Comm'n v. United
Fuel Gas Co., 317 U.S. 456, 463 (1943) (district court's remission to the state courts re-
versed because the challenged statute was not reasonably open to construction).
5. Although the procedure has not been followed in any case, one of the parties could
apply to the federal courts for reassertion of jurisdiction over the bill if the state proceed-
ing were unfair or inefficient. See Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 179 (1959).
6. See id. at 178 (dictum); AFL v. Watson, 37 U.S. 582, 597 (1946) (dictum). In
practice, however, the highest state court may determine the federal constitutional issue.
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cation of state-law issues may eliminate or transform problems concerning the
federal constitution, this procedure implements the long-standing doctrines of
avoiding unnecessary or premature constitutional determinations 7 and refrain-
ing from deciding tentative or hypothetical questions.8 Remitting the parties to
state courts also affords the state a reasonable opportunity to fashion a "com-
plete product of the state" through all competent bodies. The Pullman doctrine
thus seeks to promote harmony within the federal system by forestalling hasty
interjection of paramount federal constitutional power to enjoin state activity. 10
It is reconciled with the Judicial Code's grant of federal jurisdiction on the
grounds that a federal district judge sitting as chancellor has discretion tem-
porarily to stay extraordinary injunctive relief and that, since district-court
jurisdiction is to be retained pending remission of the parties to state courts,
federal jurisdiction is postponed but not abdicated. 1
In the second class of cases in which abstention ,has been traditionally forth-
coming-suits to enjoin certain state regulatory activities, whether or not they
raise substantial constitutional issues-federal courts are required to dismiss
the suit without retaining jurisdiction. -Congress amended the Judicial Code
during the 1930's to prevent a federal court, if an "efficient" remedy is avail-
able in state court, from enjoining enforcement of any order of a state rate-
making body "affecting rates chargeable by a public utility" 12 and from enjoin-
ing assessments or collections 'by state taxing authorities.' 3 And the Supreme
and the Supreme Court may review that decision without returning the suit to the district
court. See Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959); note 103
infra.
7. See, e.g., Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500 ('1941) ; Harrison v.
NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 176 (1959) ; Chicago v. Fieldcrest 'Dairies, Inc., 316 U.S. 168, 173
(1942).
8. See, e.g., Government & Civic Employees Organizing Comm. v. Windsor, 353 U.S.
364, 366 (1957) ; Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500 (1941).
9. Harrison v. NsAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 178 (1959).
10. See, e.g., Martin v. Creasy, 360 U.S. 219, 224 (1.959) ; Alabama Pub. Serv. Conm'n
v. Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341, 350 (1951) ; AFL v. Watson, 327 U.S. 582, 599 (1946);
Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941).
11. See Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 177 (1959) ; Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319
U.S. 315, 338-39 (1943) (dissenting opinion).
12. 28 U.S.C. § 1342 (1958) (formerly Johnson Act, ch. 283, 48 Stat. 775 (1934)).
13. 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1958) (formerly "Anti-Tax-Injunction Act," ch. 726, 50 Stat.
738 (1937)).
Both this act and the Johnson Act, note 12 supra, were motivated ,by a congressional
desire to lessen the advantages which federal jurisdiction offered large corporations able
to resort to the federal courts,. suit in which may involve greater delay. The Johnson Act
was more specifically designed to protect continuing state regulatory policy from sporadic
federal intervention in cases involving out-of-state corporations, which would perhaps de-
stroy the uniformity and continuity of industry-wide supervision; the Anti-Tax-Injunction
Act sought to remedy the disruptive effect upon state and local finance caused by the
uncollectibility of taxes during a federal injunction suit. For legislative history of the
Johnson Act, see S. REP. No. 125, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1934). For legislative history
of the Anti-Tax-Injunction Act, see S. REP. No. 1035, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1937) ;
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Court has twice barred federal injunction of other orders issued by state ad-
ministrative agencies.' 4 In 1943, Burford v. Sun Oil Co.'r upheld district-court
dismissal of a suit to enjoin enforcement of an order prorationing production
of oil among producers located in Texas.16 Distinguishing factors but a com-
mon rationale were involved in Alabamna Pub. Scr-a. Conim'u v. Southern Ry., T
a 1951 decision, where the Court directed dismissal of a district-court decision
Note, 59 HAv. L. Rnv. 780, 783 (1946). Both acts may in part have resulted from an
antipathy of the federal judiciary during the depression years to state programs of eco-
nomic reform. See Note, 53 YALE L.J. 788 n.4, 795 n.40 (1944).
In 1910, Congress forbade the federal courts from enjoining state-court proceedings
except in specifically authorized cases. See 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1958). See also Note, 59
COLUm. L. Ray. 749, 750-51 (1959).
14. In Pennsylvania v. Williams, 294 U.S. 176 (1935), no administrative agency was
involved, but the state had established an elaborate judicial scheme through which state
officials handled receivership proceedings. The Court abstained from granting an injunc-
tion and from appointing a receiver in order to give regard for the "rightful independence
of state governments in carrying out their domestic policy." Id. at 185. For a discussion of
cases following this rationale, see 1 MooaE, FEDERAL Pacrxat 11 0217 (2d ed. 1959) ; out-
side the area of federal receivership proceedings the Wiilaiams decision has not been fol-
lowed. See Note, 59 COLTum. L. Ry. 749, 755 (1959).
15. 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
16. In order to create a uniform policy for the conservation of oil and gas, the Texas
legislature designated the courts in Travis county as exclusively competent to review the
proration orders of the Tex-as Railroad -Commission. The Court's rationale rested in part
upon the extreme complexity of the prorationing system and the confusion which had been
cast into the program by federal-court decisions which resulted in the Texas Governor
having to declare martial law and call a special session of the legislature to revise the law
after the federal decisions. Id. at 329.
Proration orders of the Commission had earlier been before the Court in a confusing
series of cases also relevant to the scope of federal jurisdiction. In Railroad Comm'n v.
Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 310 U.S. 573 (1940), decided three years before Burford, Mr.
Justice Frankfurter wrote the majority opinion reversing a district-court decree enjoining
enforcement of the Commission's proration order. The opinion of the Court was later
amended to state that the claimed violation of federal due process was "untenable" and,
since it was unclear under Texas decisions whether local courts could "exercise an in-
dependent judgment on what is reasonable," any relief provided by state statute must be
pursued in state courts. Railroad .Comm'n v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 311 U.S. 614, 615
(1940). Six months later the Court decided another case between the same parties arising
from the revised order of the Commission adopted after the district court enjoined enforce-
ment of its original order. Railroad Comm'n v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 311 U.S. 570
(1941). The Court again vacated the district court's injunction on the ground that any
claim should be adjusted by the "expert commission"' and that even if the claim was based
on a constitutional question it was outside the province of feeral courts and "plainly be-
yond their special competence." Id. at 577. In this decision there was no determination of
the constitutional issue as in the earlier case, 310 U.S. 573 (1940), but, as in Burford, diver-
sity jurisdiction was denied. Roa & Nichols has been cited with Burford for the proposi-
tion that federal courts may refuse to appraise or shape domestic policy of the state govern-
ing its administrative agencies. Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 235 (1943).
17. 341 U.S. 341 (1951).
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enjoining the enforcement of an order denying a railroad's petition for a dis-
continuance of certain intrastate service.18 Because the federal district court
did not retain jurisdiction in either suit ' 9-the parties were left to state-court
review procedures set -forth in state statutes-and because he apparently re-
garded no questions of applicable state law as reasonably open to interpreta-
tion, or as involving "a specialized field... in which out-of-State federal judges
are not at home,"'20 Mr. Justice Frankfurter distinguished Pullman and viewed
the dismissals as unwarranted denials of Congress' grant of federal jurisdic-
tion, diversity jurisdiction in particular. 21 But the majority considered the dis-
cretion of a court of equity broad enough to support dismissal.22 Underlying
18. Like Burford, Alabama involved a complicated area of state interest where a con-
tinuous and consistent program for a regulated industry was desirable and where the state
had provided for review by a single court. The principal distinguishing factor is that fed-
eral judges are familiar with the Alabama type of regulation through their review of 10C
orders, while in Burford problems outside the normal competence of the federal courts
were presented. See Comment, 46 IIu.. L. ,REv. 756, 760 (1951). Burford and Alabama
were followed in Ohio Transp., Inc. v. Public Util. 'Comm'n, 243 F.2d 536, 539 (6th Cir.
1957) (order of commission revoking operating permit of transport company) ; Atlantic
Coast Line R.R. v. ;City of St. IPetersburg, 242 F.2d 613, 615 (5th ICir. 1957) (an order
directing the railroad to remove its stations from present locations and construct new sta-
tions as determined by the commission); General Inv. & Serv. Corp. v. Wichita Water
Co., 236 F.2d 464, 468 (10th Cir. 1956) (suit by customers for injunction restraining water
company from collecting a surcharge on water rates) ; see 1 lVtooRE, FEzRAL PmACeIcE
ff 0.203[1], at 2106 n.11 (2d ed. 1959) ; Note, 59 COLUm. L. REv. 749, 758-60 & nn.60, 66,
& 71 (1959) (Alabama rule is limited to suits challenging the action of state regulatory
commissions).
19. For the proposition that the federal system could retain jurisdiction in such cases,
see Note, 59 COLUM. L. Ray. 749, 775-76 (1959).
20. 341 U.S. at 361.
21. Id. at 361-62 (concurring opinion).
Again and again legislation designed to make inroads on diversity jurisdiction
has been proposed to Congress, and on each occasion Congress has deliberately
refused to act....
It is not for us to say that litigation affecting state laws and state policies ought
to be tried only in the state courts. Congress has chosen to confer diversity juris-
diction upon the federal courts.
Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 337, 345 (1943) (dissenting opinion) ; accord, Ala-
bama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341, 358-59 (1951) (concurring
opinion) (Congress, by rejecting many proposals to limit diversity jurisdiction, intended
that the courts would continue to exercise that jurisdiction except as restricted 'by "ex-
plicit and detailed legislation.").
22. The Burlord and Alabama cases seem to implement the policy considerations of
the Johnsbn Act and Anti-Tax-Injunction Act. See note -13 supra. The decisions preserve
the autonomy of state industry-wide regulation and lessen the ability of large corporations
to gain from federal jurisdiction. They therefore seem no greater departure from the
literal language of the congressional amendments than a subsequent holding that a declara-
tory judgment challenging the validity of state taxes is not available in federal courts be-
cause such judgment would work as great an interference with state activities as an in-
junction. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293, 298 (1943), examined
critically in Note, 59 HARV. L. REv. 780, 782-83 (1946).
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these congressional and judicial exceptions to federal jurisdiction is the tradi-
tional equity policy requiring litigants to exhaust adequate legal remedies-
albeit remedies available only in state courts--before invoking the special
powers of chancery.2 In addition, these exceptions were designed to promote
harmony within the federal system by deferring to state procedures -for review
of administrative orders,2 4 and allowing the state to formulate a consistent
regulatory .policy free from sporadic federal intervention. 0 And such excep-
tions presuppose that federal judges are less competent to review complex find-
ings of state administrative ibodies than the state courts which customarily re-
view them.20 Finally, these exceptions reflect the fact that without them state
interpretation of the validity of state regulatory activities could often be frus-
trated by utility companies, railroads, and other foreign corporations. Since
such corporations could consistently invoke federal jurisdiction on diversity
grounds or 'by raising federal constitutional issues,2 7 and since often no domes-
tic corporation is subject to a state agency's jurisdiction, state courts might be
permanently deprived of the opportunity to construe state regulatory statutes
or the reasonableness of their administration by state officials.
23. Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341, 349-50 (1951) (if
legal remedies are available in the state court they should be exhausted before a federal
court will grant the "extraordinary relief of an injunction"). In Prentis v. Atlantic Coast
Line Co., 211 U.S. 210 (1908), a suit by a railroad seeking injunctive relief against rates
fixed by the state commission, the bill was retained by the federal court and the parties
remitted to the state courts since the railroad had not taken an appeal as provided by state
law. While for the majority this was not the decisive factor warranting abstention, to Mr.
Chief Justice Fuller, dissenting, the failure of the railroad to avail itself of the right of
appeal was .fatal to the bill. "In such circumstances it is the settled rule that courts of
equity will not interfere." Id. at 236. For a discussion of the reasons for requiring that
state remedies be exhausted, see Note, 43 HAv. L. Rev. 379, 387 (1930).
For a line of cases holding that availability of legal remedies in state courts does not
warrant withholding equitable remedies in federal courts, see note 97 inIra.
24. See Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 327 (1943) ("Delay, misunderstanding
of local law, and needless federal conflict with the state policy, are the inevitable product
6f this double system of review."); id. at 331 ; Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern
Ry., 341 U.S. 341, 350 (1951).
25. See Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 327 (1943) (concurring opinion) (less
than 10% of the review cases from the Texas Railroad Commission come before the
federal courts, which can therefore "make small contribution to the well organized system
of regulation and review which the Texas statutes provide").
26. Ibid. ("Concentration of judicial supervision of Railroad Commission orders per-
mits the state courts... to acquire a specialized knowledge which is useful in shaping the
policy of regulation of the ever-changing demands in this field") ; see Frankfurter, Dis-
tribution of Judicial Power Between United Stales and State Courta, 13 Copztx LQ.
499, 519 (1928).
27. See 81 CONG. Rm 1415-16 (1937)'; S. REP. No. 1035, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937).
A limitation on a corporation's opportunities to obtain diversity jurisdiction is imposed by
a 1958 amendment to the Judiciary Act. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1958) (in pertinent part:
"For purposes of this section ... a corporation shall be deemed a citizen of any state by
which it has been incorporated and of the state where it has its principal place of busi-
ness.") ; see Note, 4 Vni. L. RLv. 451 (1959).
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Five months after Burford, the 'Court 'handed down its landmark decision in
Meredith v. Winter Haven,28 which was widely interpreted as halting erosion
of the Judicial Code's grant of diversity jurisdiction .2  The -federal courts had
been under increasing temptation after Erie R.R. v. Tompkins 30 to avoid
difficult interpretations of state law -by declining to accept jurisdiction al In
Meredith, out-of-state bondholders, invoking federal jurisdiction solely on diver-
sity grounds, had sought to enjoin the city's redemption of municipal bonds
without provision for payment of deferred interest coupons. The Fifth Circuit
reversed the injunction that 'had 'been issued below and 'held that the district
court should have dismissed the bill because state decisions construing govern-
ing statutes were in apparent conflict.32 But the Supreme Court, on certiorari,
in turn reversed the court of appeals. In the Court's view, the conflict in state
decisions did not warrant denial of a federal forum despite the 4act that the
remedy sought was injunction of state action. After Meredith, in which the
Court reviewed and synthesized its prior decisions restricting federal court
power to enjoin state action,33 no new limitation on the exercise of properly
invoked federal jurisdiction was condoned by a majority of the 'Court until last
term.
34
In 1959, the 'Court decided Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibo-
daux.3 5 The City had 'brought an action at law in a state court of original
jurisdiction to expropriate land, buildings, and equipment of the power com-
pany under a Louisiana enabling statute.3 6 The company, a Florida corpora-
tion, removed the action to federal court on diversity grounds alone and set up
28. 320 U.S. 228 (1943), Note, 53 YAr L.J. 788 (1944).
29. See Comment, The Decline of Federal Concurrent Equity Jurisdctiou, 40 CALIF.
L. REv. 300, 305-06 (1952) ; 'Note, 48 COLUm. L. REv. 575, 584 (1948) ; 92 U. PA. L. Rnv.
330 (1944).
30. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
31. See Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, 134 F.2d 202, 207 (5th Cir. 1943) (citing
cases) ; Clark, State Law ii the Federal Courts: The Brooding Onnipresence of Erie v.
Tompkins, 55 YALE L.J. 267, 293 (1946) ; Comment, 19 U. Cm. L. R v. 361, 362 (1952)
("Since one aim of the Erie doctrine is the securing of uniformity in the law, it is not sur-
prising that federal jurisdiction has been curtailed where there is a possibility that this
problem might arise.").
32. Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, 134 F.2d 202, 206 (5th Cir., 1943).
33. 320 U.S. at 235-36. Meredith sanctioned remission in Pullnzan-type cases, remand
in a summary bankruptcy proceeding for a plenary trial of doubtful state law, see p:ote 3
supra, dismissal of suits to liquidate an insolvent loan. association, see note 14 supra, and
dismissal of actions reviewing state administrative agencies as in Burlord. See, Comment,
The Decline of Federal Concurrent Equity Jurisdi,;tioi, 40 ICALIF. L. REv. 300, 305-06
(1952) ; Note, 53 YAI.F L.J. 788 (1944).
34. It would seem permissible to view Alabama as within the rationale of tle congres-
sional amendments and Burlord as discussed supra, notes 1.7-27 and accompanying text.
35. 360 U.S. 25 (1959).
36. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 19:101 (1951), which states in pertinent part: "Any
municipal corporation of Louisiana may expropriate any electric light, gas, or waterworks
plant or -property whenever such a course is thought necessary for the public interest by
the mayor and council of the municipality."
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an affirmative defense based upon an opinion rendered six years earlier by
Louisiana's attorney general in a comparable fact situation.37 Since the prop-
erty sought to be expropriated was brought within city limits after the com-
pany's franchise was granted, his opinion had reasoned, that franchise had be-
come a "vested right"; thus the city was barred from acquiring the company's
property except by amicable purchase. Despite this opinion, the enabling stat-
ute's language seemed to authorize expropriation. But the statute, enacted in
1900, 'had never been construed by Louisiana courts. Therefore, the district
judge decided on his own motion to employ the Pullman procedure.- s He
stayed the suit pending state-court construction of the statute in an action to
be brought by the parties in accordance with Louisiana's declaratory judgment
act, and retained jurisdiction over the remaining issues in the case-such as
the amount of compensation. The city appealed from the stay, presumably be-
cause it felt that excessive delay would result.3 9 The Fifth Circuit concluded
that a stay of an action at law was an appealable order under section 1292(a)
of the Judicial Code,40 and reversed, relying on Meredith for the proposition
that an expropriation proceeding is not one in which federal courts correctly
abstain from decision.4'
On certiorari, the Supreme Court eliminated the appealability question 4
and upheld the district court's abstention from decision in an opinion by Mr.
Justice Frankfurter, who wrote for five Justices; Mr. Justice Stewart specially
concurred, while three members of the Court dissented. The five-man majority
reasoned that, since the district court retained control of the litigation, the stay
was "only a postponement of a decision" and was no more a denial of diversity
jurisdiction than is a Pullnan-type case a denial of federal-question jurisdic-
tion.43 Meredith was distinguished on the ground that in that case the suit was
dismissed, not stayed." Like Pidinzan, the opinion emphasized that, because
the attorney general's opinion created reasonable room for differing construc-
tions of the long-dormant statute, the district judge had power to obtain an
"authoritative" state interpretation.45 The federal judge is an "outsider" who
might discern less in the statute than state courts, the majority reasoned, and
his interpretation thereof might result in undesirable inconsistency with sub-
37. [1950-1952] Ops. LA. A7-'Y Gmx. 142. The opinion was written in 1951 to a city
official of Winnfield, La., requesting information on the city's power to expropriate prop-
erty of the Louisiana Power & Light Company.
38. City of Thibodaux v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 153 F. Supp. 515 (E.D. La.
1957).
39. See 360 U.S. at 43 (dissenting opinion) (the city estimated a minimum of two
additional years before the state supreme court would render a declaratory judgment).
40. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (1958): The court relied on Council of AV. Elec. Tech-
nical Employees v. Western Elec. Co., 238 F2d 892 (2d Cir. 1956).
41. City of Thibodaux v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 255 F.2d 774 (5t1 Cir. 1958).
42. Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 26 & n.1 (1959).
43. Id. at 29.
44. Id. at 27 n2.
45. Id. at 30.
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sequent interpretations 'by state courts determining the rights of litigants in
similar situations.40 The majority recognized that the case was one at law, un-
like cases following Pullman and Burford, all of which 'had Ibeen suits invoking
the equity powers of the federal courts. But Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinion
stated that a district court's discretion to remit parties before it to state courts
does not derive from a "technical rule of equity procedure" but from a policy,
equally applicable in a suit at law, of maintaining "harmonious federal-state
relations." Furthermore, the transition from equity to lav was justified on the
grounds that an "eminent domain proceeding" is a "special and peculiar" suit
at law concerning a "matter close to the political interests of a state." 47
These last statements, as well as the majority's articulation of the reason for
granting certiorari,4 8 might indicate that Thibodaux makes remission available
only in cases challenging an exercise of the state's eminent domain power. But
the view that eminent domain expropriations are "special and peculiar" suits
at law for federal abstention purposes was rejected by a majority of the Court
in Cdunty of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co.,40 decided the same day. More-
over, both reasons which the Thibodaux majority gave for distinguishing
eminent domain suits appear equally applicable whenever an out-of-state liti-
gant attempts to upset the action of a state or one of its political subdivisions.
First, the Thibodaux majority stated that eminent domain is "intimately in-
volved with the sovereign prerogative."5 0 As authority for this proposition, the
Court relied solely upon a 1905 dissenting opinion 'by Mr. Justice Holmes,
which had argued that eminent domain expropriations are not removable to a
federal court unless the state specifically waives its immunity from suit in that
forum. 51 But this view 'had never been followed before Thibodaux 52 and, even
46. Ibid.
47. Id. at 28-29.
48. "We granted certiorari ... because of the importance of the question in the judi-
cial enforcement of the power of eminent domain under diversity jurisdiction." Id. at 26.
49.' 360 U.S. 185, 191-93 (1959). lashuda was a suit for a judgment of ouster brought
in a federal district court under an unequivocal state statute to upset a county condemna-
tion effectuated in the state courts. Mr. Justice Brennan, writing for the majority-n-
cluding Ifr. Justice Whittaker, who had concurred with the majority opinion in Thlbodaux,
and Mr. Justice Stewart, who wrote a separate concurring opinion in that case, based sole-
ly on the fact that state law was in doubt-in upholding federal court jurisdiction, em-
ployed language virtually identical with that in his Tlibodaux dissent in rejecting the view
that eminent domain suits are "special and peculiar." The opinion pointed to other areas
of state interest where the federal courts have exercised jurisdiction-a city's power to
license motor vehicles, state's power to regulate fishing in its waters, and the power to
regulate intrastate trucking rates-and concluded that "the fact that a case concerns a
State's power of eminent domain no more justifies abstention than the fact that it involves
any otlier issue related to sovereignty." Id. at 191-92; see 1 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN
§ 1.13[1l (3d ed. 1950). For an attempt to reconcile Thibodaux with Mashuda, see Note,
108 U. PA. L. Rav. 226, 240-50 (1959).
50. 360 U.S. at -28.
51. Madisonville Traction Co. v. Saint Bernard £Mining Co., 196 U.S. 239, 257 (1905).
Mr. Justice Holmes reasoned that a state waives its sovereign immunity in eminent domain
cases only in the courts which the state has named. If the legislature does not specifically
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if it had 'been, its rationale would seem applicable not only to expropriation
suits but also to all suits in which state action is challenged on other than
federal constitutional grounds. Second, the Thibodaux majority suggests that
eminent domain suits are "special and peculiar" because they concern the
"apportionment of governmental powers between the City and State."5 3 But so
does any challenge of -the lawfulness of actions of municipal officials or political
subdivisions of a state not based on federal law.54 Furthermore, although the
Burford rationale can logically be limited to suits challenging orders of state
regulatory commissions, the expropriation in Thibodaux was an ad hoc action,
not part of a continuing policy of industry supervision and not demanding a
greater degree of consistency in governing law than any other state action.
Therefore, since any suit in which state action is challenged would seem to in-
volve a "matter close to the political interests of a State,ss it may prove dif-
ficult to avoid the thrust of Thibodaux in any such suit. Indeed, a dictum in
another case decided the same term, 6 separate opinions by Mr. Justice Frank-
furter in two earlier cases, 57 and a footnote in Thibodaux,rs might indicate that
provide for exclusive review by state courts, he concluded that silence imports as much
for "certainly [the statute] ... does not purport to authorize them elsewhere, and that is
enough." Id. at 259.
52. ,See Madisonville Traction -Co. v. Saint Bernard Mining Co., 196 U.S. 239, 247-50
(1905) (discussion of two eminent domain cases removed to the federal courts-Boom
Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403 (1878) ; Searl v. School Dist. No. 2, 124 U.S. 197 (1888)).
The majority in Madisonville reasoned that if a state could withdraw an eminent domain
proceeding from federal court cognizance the congressional purpose in the Judiciary Act
would be defeated. "Under any other view a State, by its own tribunals, could deprive
citizens of other States of their property by condemnation, without giving them an oppor-
tunity to protect themselves, in a National Court, against local prejudice and influence."
196 Ti:S. at 253-54. The cases are legion holding that when "condemnation is effected by
judicial proceedings instituted by the condemnor, such proceedings constitute a suit of a
civil nature and if there is the requisite diversity of citizenship the federal courts have
jurisdiction from the inception of the proceedings." 6 NicHoLS, E~anx= Do-uxN § 27.8
[2] (3d ed. 1953).
53. 360 U.S. at 28
54. All powers of municipalities, counties, school districts, and other political sub-
divisions are granted by the states. Theiefore, the issue of "apportionment" of state powers
is present whenever actions of any such subdivision or officer thereof are challenged, unless
that challenge is that federal rights have been abrogated.
55. Id. at 29.
56. The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588, 595-96 (1959). Mr. Justice Stewart
stated for the majority that remission procedure might plausibly have been used in that
federal-question case between private parties since it was unclear how the state courts
would interpret a state wrongful death statute. But the Court declined to require such a
disposition since counsel had not suggested it, id. at 596 n.1, and there had not therefore
been opportunity for thorough evaluation of "competing jurisdictional considerations" in
light of Meredith and Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472 (1949), 358 U.S. at 596. Mr. Justice
Frankfurter concurred in the holding because he agreed with the Court's determination on
the merits but would have preferred remission. Id. at 597.
57. Sutton v. Leib, 34Z U.S. 402, 412 (1952) (concurring opinion) ; Propper v. Clark,
337 U.S. 472, 493-97 (1949) (dissenting opinion). Sutton was a suit between private parties
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the Thibodaux majority will approve remission in all diversity cases, even
those between private parties, if the relevant issue of state law is fairly open
to interpretation.
The majority would apparently limit remission, as sanctioned by Thibodaux,
to diversity cases only when applicable state law is in doubt, but the nature
and measure of the doubt necessary to give rise to the procedure is itself tin-
clear. The Thibodaux majority viewed the "mere difficulty" created by the
conflicting decisions of the Florida Supreme (Court in Meredith as insufficient
to require dismissal, 59 but found the "quandary" posed by the state attorney
general's opinion in Thibodaux as enough to warrant remission. 00 Perhaps the
doubt created ,by a conflict in decisions is to be regarded as less serious than,
and therefore distinguishable from, uncertainties arising from an absence of
relevant state-court decisions, the latter but not the former warranting remis-
sion. But it would seem more tenable to accept the Court's distinction that
Meredith is inapposite when, instead of dismissing the complaint, the district
judge employs the remission procedure. The Meredith rationale .has 'been fol-
lowed in Supreme Court as well as lower court cases involving an absence of
relevant state decisions, as well as those concerning a conflict in such de-
cisions. 61 Similarly, the remission procedure of Thibodaux -would appear ap-
plicable even when uncertainty arises from a conflict in state decisions.02 And
it would seem that the degree of 'uncertainty in state law need not be very
great; the only doubt in interpreting the "apparently clear" statute in Thibo-
daux was created by the attorney general's opinion 03 -an opinion which is
for payment of alimony, and the majority decided the case on the basis of state law even
though no Illinois statute or decision existed which the federal court could follow. Mr.
Justice Frankfurter considered that since "there is no Illinois law" on the crucial issue of
alimony the Court should avail itself of the state declaratory judgment procedure to obtain
an authoritative decision. 342 U.S. at 413.
Propper was a suit between the Alien Property Custodian and a state-appointed re-
ceiver which rested on an issue of state law "easily susceptible of varying interpretations"
on which the state courts had not spoken. Mr. Justice Frankfurter would have reversed
the lower court because it did not remit the parties to the state courts on that issue. 337
U.S. at 497.
58. 360 U.S. at 27 n.2. In distinguishing Meredith, the footnote suggests that the dis-
trict judge would have had discretion to remit the parties in that case.
59. Id. at 27.
60. Id. at 30.
61. See, e.g., Sutton v. Leib, 342 U.S. 402, 412 (1952) ("What the Illinois rule is ...
under present circumstances . . . has not, so far as we know, been determined.") ; Propper
v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472, 486 (1949) ("The precise issue of law involved . . . is one which
has not been decided by the New York courts!') ; Slattery v. Marra Bros., 186 F.2d 134,
139 (2d Cir. 1951) ; Dally v. Parker, 152 F.2d 174, 177 (7th' Cir. 1945).
62. See American Airlines, Inc. v. Louisville & Jefferson County Air Bd., 269 F.2d
811 (6th Cir. 1959) (conflict in decisions; remitted on the authority of Thibodaux).
63. 360 U.S. at 30. The degree of uncertainty of the state law in Thibodaux appears
to be much less than that which Mr. Justice Frankfurter considered in his Burford dissent
to warrant remission in constitutional cases--"a federal court in attempting to apply ...




advisory only,6 made for the benefit of administrative department heads,05 and
not necessarily given any weight by Louisiana courts."6
Furthermore the Court's distinction between remission in Thibodaux and
dismissal in Meredith 67 may not be a real one; since remission may in prac-
tice defeat federal adjudication, that procedure may often be tantamount to
dismissal. The delay and expense for litigants occasioned by remission may
deter the party who controls the choice of forum from initiating suits in or
removing them to the federal courts; hence, post-Thibodaux federal jurisdic-
tion may not afford the reasonable alternative to state adjudication which Con-
gress sought to provide.68 Or, the expense or delay of remission may enable
the financially strong party controlling the choice of forum-who may select
a federal forum for precisely this reason P--to postpone an adverse decision
or to force his opponent into settling or abandoning the suit.70 Furthermore,
64. [1.942-1944] 2 Ops. LA. Afr'Y GE 1. 1587, 1591; see L.. Rnv. STAT. AN.-N. § 49:251
(1950).
65. [1942-1944] 2 Ops. LA. AT'rr'y GEN. 1587, 1591 (The opinions should be followed
by administrative departments unless in so doing it "would cause complications from a
practical standpoint" in which case "it would be better to disregard the opinions than to
strictly follow them, especially where to do so would disrupt an established rule or custom
of the department.").
66. Labit v. Terrebonne Parish School Bd., 49 So. 7d 431, 434 (La. Ct. App. 1950)
(the attorney general's interpretation of a state statute has no judicial significance);
[1942-1944] 2 Ops. LA. AAm'y GEN. 1587, 1591 ("The opinions of this Department are
not intended to take the place of opinions of courts involving statutory construction as they
are only advisory in their nature.").
67. 360 US. at 27 n2.
68. See County of Allegheny v. Frank Aashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 196 (1959) (refusal
to exercise properly invoked diversity jurisdiction ". . . exacts a severe penalty from citi-
zens for their attempt to exercise rights of access to the federal courts granted... by
Congress ... !'). See also Note, 59 CoLUM L. REv. 749, 764 (1959) ; Clark, State Law
in the Federal Courts: Tle Brooding Onmipresence of Eric v. Tompkins, 55 YI.n L.J.
267, 294 (1946) ; S. REP. No. 125, 73d Cong., Zd Sess. 8 (1934) ; H.R. REP. No. 1194, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1934).
69. Of course, the district judge might be unsympathetic to a proposal to stay a suit
to allow a party who has just removed to the federal court to return to the state courts.
But the party controlling the choice of the forum may anticipate that the judge will stay
the suit sua sponte as in Thibodaux.
70. See Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 31, 43-44
(1959) (dissenting opinion) :
I think it is more than coincidence that.., in this case and in Afashuda the party
supporting abstention is the one presently in possession of the property in question.
I cannot escape the conclusion in these cases that delay in the reaching of a decision
is more important to those parties than the .tribunal which ultimately renders the
decision. The Court today upholds a procedure which encourages such delay and
prevents "that promptness of decisions which in all judicial actions is one of the
elements of justice." Forsyth v. Hammnwod, 166 U.S. 506, 513.
Congress was particularly concerned, at the time the exceptions to the diversity grant were
adopted, with the advantages wealthy corporations possessed in the federal courts by being
able to wear out their opponents and compel them to settle or submit to an unjust judg-
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remission may carry with it all or the major part of a controversy, including
factual determinations on which, under the theory of diversity jurisdiction, a
party is entitled to a federal judge, or judge and jury, to avoid local preju-
dice.71 In Thibodaum, for example, a state-court declaratory judgment will
necessarily involve measuring the facts of the controversy, which may 'be much
disputed, against the terms of the statute. But even if fact considerations could
be conveniently separated-if indeed a clear distinction 'between law and fact
were possible--the state courts may "reasonably require complete adjudication
of the controversy" as a condition of accepting jurisdiction, "and the 'federal
court might find itself blocked 'by res judicata with the result that the entire
.. controversy could be ousted from the federal courts where it was placed
by Congress. 7 2 Remission is therefore quite different from the widely advo-
cated 73 procedure, which is provided 'by statute in one state,74 of certifying an
issue from federal court to the highest state court. Under that procedure, only
the certified issue of law would be decided by the state court, and only on the
record, in an attempt to avoid disputes over facts. 75
By obscuring the relatively predictable 'boundaries of the abstention doctrine
which had survived since Meredith, the ,'Court created considerable uncertain-
ty which may increase the volume of interlocutory appeals. 70 For the narrow
ment. The remission procedure increases even more the cost of litigation which Congress
felt unduly favored these large corporations and wealthy individuals. S. REP. No. 125, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 11-12 (1934) ; H.R. REP. No. 1194, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 18-19 (1934). But
cf. American Airlines, Inc. v. Louisville & Jefferson County Air Bd., 269 F.2d 811, 827
(6th Cir. 1959) ("We are not unmindful of the delay, inconvenience and cost attendant
upon our conclusion that proper exercise of discretion requires the Federal courts to...
remit the parties to the Kentucky courts .... ").
71. See Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 344 (1943) (dissenting opinion of
Frankfurter, J.).
72. Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472, 491-92 (1949); see Lassiter v. Northampton
County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 46 (1959) (state court decided federal constitutional
issue which district court "retained") ; Note, 59 CoLum. L. REv. 749, 777 n.185 (1959).
73. See HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 866
(1953) ; Kurland, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, The Supreme Court and the Erie Doctrine in
Diversity Cases, 67 YALE L.J. 187, 214 (1957) ; Vestal, The Certified Question of Law,
36 IowA L. REv. 629, 643-47 (1951).
74. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 25.031 (Cum. Supp. 1958) (The supreme court of Florida may
answer a certified question of state law from a federal appellate court if the answer would
be determinative of the cause and there are no clear controlling precedents of the state
supreme court).
75. See Vestal, supra note 73, at 634. Nonetheless, a tendency would exist to pose and
answer the certified question in the form of an abstract proposition of law rather than as
the vital point of controversy between litigants. See id. at 646-47.
76. If an interlocutory order granting or denying a stay of proceedings pending re-
mission is made in an action at law, as is likely to .be so in cases following Tibodaux, "the
grant of a stay is characterized as an injunction by an equity court of a legal action, and a
refusal as a refusal to enjoin. Thus, both would be appealable under [28 U.S.C. §] 1292
(a) (1) [(1958)].' Comment, 69 YALE L.J. 333, 352 (1959). Section 1292(a) (1) would
not be thus available if the suit was in equity, but 28 US.C. § 1292(b) (1958) allows dis-
cretionary interlocutory appeal of orders not otherwise appealable. But, although either a
[Vol. 69: 643
ABSTENTION
and reasonably well-defined Pullman area of remission and Burford area of
dismissal, the Court has substituted a grant of discretionary power to the dis-
trict judge to remit doubtful issues of law to state courts.77 Although it has
been predicted that this grant of discretion will avoid appellate review,"8 its
scope remains entirely obscure and, so long as it does not extend to all cases,
definition of its outer limits may generate appeals.1 0 Litigants could appeal on
the grounds that, on the facts of a particular case, the district judge abused
his discretion either ,by remitting or failing to do so.8 0 Future appeals may be
necessary to ascertain whether the judge's discretion extends, for example,
only to eminent domain cases, to suits in equity challenging state action, to all
suits whether law or equity "close to the political interests of the State," to all
diversity suits including those between private parties, or to federal question
cases not presenting constitutional issues. The judge's consideration of, or
failure to consider, irreparable injury to one of the parties,8 ' the vagaries of
the local declaratory judgment procedure, or the requirements of federal-state
grant or a denial might meet the substantive criteria for appeal under 1292(b)-even the
"substantial grounds for difference of opinion!' test; although the order is discretionary,
the bounds of Thibodaux seem sufficiently hazy-a district judge may be reluctant to exer-
cise his discretion to allow an appeal alleging his abuse of discretion. See generally Com-
ment, 69 YALE L.J. 333 (1958). If so, an aggrieved party may find some relief under the
All-Writs Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1958). See 6 Moo.E FEEDAL PRACTICE f 54.1014],
at 871 (1955) ("an appropriate writ may issue to review a non-appealable interlocutory
order... where the court of appeals has appellate jurisdiction over a final judgment ren-
dered in the case").
77. 360 U.S. at 29 ("Procedures for effective judicial administration presuppose a
federal judiciary composed of judges well-equipped and of sturdy character in whom may
safely be vested, as is already, a wide range of judicial discretion, subject to appropriate
review on appeal.").
78. See Note, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 226, 248 (1959) (grant of discretion will obviate
procedural appeals because the court's creation of clear guide lines will be treated as con-
clusive) ; Wright, The Abstention Doctrine Reconsidered, 37 TXAs L Rav. 815, 825-26
(1959) (the district judge's exercise of discretion should not be reviewable by the appel-
late courts except on grounds of abuse of discretion).
79. See Note, 59 CoLuSm. L. Ray. 749, 778 n.194, 779 n.196 (1959).
80. Cf. Landis v. North Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 256-57 (1936), holding that the dis-
cretion of the district judge, when several companies bring injunctive actions against the
enforcement of an act by the same government commission in several district courts, to
stay the action in one district court pending the outcome in another is "abused" if "not kept
within the bounds of moderation."
81. In Creasy v. Stevens, 160 F. Supp. 404 (W.D. Pa. 1958), a Pullman-type case,
the district judge granted an injunction against state officials continuing the construction of
a limited access highway because the plaintiff otherwise "would suffer substantial financial
losses during the time it would take to litigate the constitutionality of the statute in the
State Courts... ." Id. at 409. The district court was reversed by the Supreme Court on
the traditional grounds of reluctance of federal courts to enjoin state activity when the state
courts provide a procedure through which the plaintiffs can preserve their rights. Martin
v. Creasy, 360 U.S. 219 (1959). The Court determined that "the circumstances which
should impel a federal court to abstain from blocking the exercise by state officials of their
appropriate functions are present here in a marked degree." Id. at 224.
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harmony are also examples of the grounds that might constitute the ,basis for
an appeal alleging an abuse of discretion. Even should the type of suit in which
discretionary remission is allowed become settled, appeals may 'be required to
ascertain the nature and degree of doubt in state law necessary to give the
judge such discretion.
Apart from the ubiquitous threat of appeals within the federal judicial sys-
tem, an unappealed remission order itself will result in considerable delay and
expense for litigants 82 and add to the congestion of court dockets by "making
two actions sprout where one would suffice."83 Under the declaratory judg-
ment procedure in force in most jurisdictions, 4 the determination of state law
would begin in the state court of original jurisdiction, 5 and, since only the
highest court can finally resolve the issue, proceed through two or three tiers
of state courts 86 before returning to the federal district court. This declaratory
judgment procedure is no more expeditious in most states than other civil
actions :87 The parties may 'be entitled to a jury trial on fact issues ;88 counter-
82. See, e.g., Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951). There, the
state was prevented from collecting taxes for eight years while the litigation was pending
plus the time necessary to make the changes in the law to meet the Supreme Court objec-
tions. IvIr. Justice Clark, dissenting, observed: "It has taken eight years and eight courts
to bring this battered litigation to an end. The taxes involved go back thirteen years. It is
therefore no answer to Connecticut and some thirty other states who have similar tax
measures that they can now collect the same revenues 'by enacting laws more felicitously
drafted." Id. at 614. Contra, Note, 108 U. PA. L. RFv. 226, 232 (1959) (the delay argu-
ment is a "makeweight").
83. 1. MOORE, FEDERAL PRAcrEic 0.203[1], at 2114 (2d ed. 1959). See also Kurland,
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, the Supreme Court and the Erie Doctrine in Diversity Cases, 67
YALE L.J. 187, 197 n.52 (1957).
84. The UNIFORm DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS AcT has been adopted by thirty-five states,
and of the remaining states, all but Arkansas, Mississippi, and Oklahoma have some form
of statutory declaratory relief. Harper, Declaratory Judgments in Ohio: A Case Study,
28 U. CiNc. L. REv. 33 (1959).
85. See UNIFORm DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS ACT § 1; BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDG-
MENTs 253 (2d ed. 1941) ; ANDERSON, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS §§ 16, 22 (1940). In only
two states, South Carolina and Wisconsin, may the courts of last resort take original juris-
diction in declaratory judgment actions. Id. § 16, at 64 n.15.
86. 'See UNiroRm DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS ACT § 7 '(losing party in lower state
courts has right of appeal). Although, theoretically, the issue could be resolved in the
lowest state court if the losing party did not exercise his right of appeal, in Thibodaux-
type cases, this would seem unlikely.
87. Harper, Declaratory Judgments in Ohio: A Case Study, 28 U. CINe. L. REV. 33,
66-67 (1.959) ; see Developmnents in the Law--Declaratory Judgments, 62 HARV. L. REv.
787, 828 (1949); ANDERSON, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS § 204 (1940); CONN. PRAc'lce
Book § 278 (1951) ; BOCRHAD, 'DEcLARATORY JUDGMENTS 253 (2d ed. 1941) (Kentucky
has provided that the case may be advanced on the trial calendar and that appeals must be
prosecuted within sixty days).
88. See UNIFORm DECLARATORY 'JUDGMENTS AcT § 9 (jury may be requested when-
ever such a trial would be available in any other civil action at law) ; BORCHIARD, DE-
CLARATORY JUDGMENTS 399-402 (2d ed. 1941); Note, 59 YALE L.J. 168 (1949).
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claims may be interjected ;89 the parties may be entitled to interlocutory appeals
on procedural issues ;90 and all persons who have "any interest which would
be affected" must be made parties.91 The City of Thibodaux estimated that
two years would be required to obtain a declaratory judgment in Louisiana.92
In states with more crowded court dockets, the delay may be greater. A dis-
trict judge might minimize this problem of delay and expense by wise exercise
of his discretion, refusing remission if undue inconvenience would occur. But
in Thibodaux the judge was permitted to stay on his own motion without a
showing by one of the parties that remission 'would satisfy some overriding
policy and without an opportunity for the other party to rebut on the grounds
that delay would cause irreparable injury (a factor, however, which was not
raised 'by the parties or considered by the Court on appeal).03
The Court's application of the remission procedure to a case not involving
injunction of state action is also questionable. The only major prior judicial
exceptions to the judicial Code's grant of federal jurisdiction-the Pidlnan-
and Burford-type cases-have been based on the traditional discretion of a
court of equity.94 And Congress, in enacting exceptions to the grant of federal
jurisdiction, specifically limited them to cases in which the plaintiff is seeking
89. See Harper supra note 87; CoxN. PRAcncE Boor § 278 (1951); Developments
in the Law--Declaratory "udgniss, 62 HAv. L. Rv. 787, 828 (1949).
90. ANDERSON, DIEa OuuAoa JuDGmENTs § 205 (1940) (review of decision of trial
court in declaratory judgment action is governed by rules applicable to appeals generally).
Some states allow interlocutory appeal in much the same fashion as the federal courts by
§ 1292(b), Comment, 69 YAL. L.J. 333, 335 n.17 (1959), while New York allows inter-
locutory appeal by right, id. at 334.
91. See Umzosu DEc AAToaY JuDG=NTs Acr § 11; De, elopunents in the Law-
Declaratory Judgments, 62 HA~v. L. REv. 787, 817-25 (1949).
92. Louisiana 'Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 43 (1959) (dis-
senting opinion).
93. In previous cases where a stay was granted, the suppliant for the stay had the
burden of making a case of "hardship and inequity in being required to go forwvard" in the
federal court. Ratner v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 339, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 1942)
(district court refused to stay proceedings while suit between same parties was decided in
the state court) ; Landis v. North Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 255 (1936) (dictum). See also
MacAlister v. Guterma, 263 F.2d 65, 70 (2d Cir. 1958) (motion for consolidation of three
stockholders' derivative suits pending in the same district court denied because the moving
party did not sustain burden of showing justification for the stay).
94. See Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 220 (1957) ; Propper v. Clark,
337 U.S. 472, 489-91 (1949) ; Chicago v. Fieldcrest Dairies, Inc., 316 U.S. 168 (1942). Mr.
Justice Brennan was careful to point out in the Masiudd case that no injunctive remedy
was sought but that the case was one at law presenting a "purely factual question," thus
preserving the distinction between suits at law and equity. County of Allegheny v. Frank
M fashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 188 n.1, 190 (1959). Compare ibid. with Note, 103 U. PA. L
Rxv. 225, 242 (1959). For discussion of traditional discretion of courts of equity, see
McCu T0cK, Equrry § 23 (2d ed. 1948). The correlative position, that in suits at lawr
the courts must exercise their jurisdiction, has been articulated by the lower courts. See,
e.g., Mogis v. Lyman-Richey Sand & Gravel Corp., 190 F.2d 202, 203 (8th Cir.), ce-.
denied, 342 U.S. 877 (1951); Harlow v. Ryland, 172 F.2d 784, 786 (8th Cir. 1949). See
also Note, 50 COLUM. L. REv. 710 (1950) ; Comment, 28 Taxis L. REv. 410, 415 (1950).
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an injunctive remedy.95 Federal abstention may 'be more desirable in suits for
an injunction because, in suits at law, remedies given by federal courts may
work less interference with state interests than injunction of state action.90 A
federal court sitting in equity may be able to grant a remedy which a state
court could not -have given because adequate legal remedies were available in
that court although not in .the federal forumY7 In suits at law, on the other
'hand, the federal court must always look to state law for remedies, and, even
though the state law remedy may often 'be as harsh as injunction-an eject-
ment, for example 0s8-it is nonetheless a measure of relief which the state it-
self has countenanced in the situation. Further, state officials will more often
be defendants than plaintiffs in injunction actions in federal courts, and, there-
fore, delay created by the remission procedure will normally favor the state. 0
But in suits at law the state or a subdivision may often be the plaintiff in a
removed case and, as in Thibodaux, more desirous of a speedy termination of
the litigation than of a state-court determination of issues of law. Therefore,
one underlying policy of the remission procedure--acceding to state interests
95. See notes 12, 13 & 21 supra and accompanying text.
96. Cf. McCLiNTocK, EQurry § 23 (2d ed. 1948), arguing that when money damages
are sought there can never be any greater injury inflicted on defendant by recovery than
on plaintiff by denying it, but that an award for specific relief may inflict a hardship on
defendant which is out of all proportion to the injury its refusal would cause to plaintiff.
But see Wright, The Abstention Doctrine ReconSidered, 37 TEXAs L. REv. 815, 826 (1959)
(policy requiring abstention should be applied uniformly without regard to ancient dis-
tinctions between law and equity) ; Note, 59 CoLUM. L. REv. 749, 781 (1959) (policy con-
siderations that justify a judicial decision to abstain do not depend upon the remedy pur-
sued).
97. See Risty v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry., 270 U.S. 378, 388 (1926), stating, in a suit
to enjoin county commissioners from apportioning benefits for construction or repair of a
drainage system, that "the test of equity jurisdiction in a federal court is the inadequacy
of the remedy on the law side of that court and not the inadequacy of the remedies afforded
by the state courts." Accord, DiGiovanni v. Camden Fire Ins. Ass'n, 296 U.S. 64, 69 (1935)
(dictum) ; Note, 59 COLUm. L. REv. 749, 751 & n.17 (1959). Language in Guaranty Trust
Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945), indicates that a federal court can not only grant equitable
remedies which a state court cannot give, because legal remedies are available in the state,
but also that the federal court may even grant an equitable remedy not available under any
circumstances in a state court. Id. at 105-06.
98. The landowner in County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda.Co., 360 US. 185 (1959),
sought a "judgment of ouster" which, if successful, would have as effectively curbed state
action as an injunction. In this relatively unusual case the out-of-state defendant in a state
expropriation proceeding was allowed to bring a separate action in the federal court while
the state proceeding continued in the state courts. Normally, the out-of-state defendant in
such cases will be confined to defense of the state action, and the separate action at law in
the federal court was permitted only because, in the particular situation, the same concur-
rent action could have been brought in a different state court. Id. at 190. The defendant
will usually be able to bring a separate action only in a federal court sitting in equity
requesting injunction of the state proceeding.
99. Bid cf. Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 178-79 (1959) (state officials agreed
to cooperate with the Court by "withholding action under the authority of the statutes
until a final decision is reached").
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in order to minimize friction within the federal system-is, it appears, less
often implemented in suits at law than in injunction actions.
The procedure allowed in Tlhibodaur, a diversity suit, had previously been
employed (with one limited exception) °00 only in cases like Pultman where
remission is eminently more appropriate. Application of paramount federal
constitutional law by a federal institution to strike down state action is partic-
ularly antagonistic to state interests and, therefore, to federal-state harmony.
The federal constitutional decision, if adverse to the state, may cripple or
nullify the challenged state action and similar future action. In diversity cases,
on the other hand, "a federal court is, 'in effect, only another court of the
State' "101 applying the state's own law. Indeed, a state's interest in rapid ex-
ecutive action may be hampered by the Thibodaux procedure. Provocation of
state antagonism is less likely, moreover, since the federal decision can be dis-
regarded with impunity by state courts in future cases.
In addition, remission is peculiarly suited to the Pullman-type case because
the policy of avoiding premature or unnecessary constitutional determinations
justifies the delay the procedure occasions, a factor not present in diversity
cases. While remission in constitutional cases may not deny federal jurisdic-
tion, in diversity cases it might more properly be viewed as defeating, not as
postponing, the out-of-state litigant's right to a federal-court adjudication.
When a federal court remits parties to state courts to obtain a declaratory
judgment on a particular issue in diversity cases, that issue-probably, as in
Thibodaux, the key issue in the case-will never receive a federal hearing.1°2
The state-court determination would be res judicata in federal district court
and, because no federal issue would exist, an appeal to the Supreme Court
would not lie. In constitutional cases, by contrast, unless the state action is in-
validated by the state courts, a federal court-either the district court or the
Supreme Court on appeal from the highest state court-would have power to
review the issue again and adjudicate the plaintiff's constitutional claim in
light of the state construction. 0 3
100. Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 309 U.S. 478 (1940) ; see note 3 supra.
The Thompson case was not a federal question case even though the railroad was in re-
organization, since the issue involved was a state property law question and required no
interpretation of the Bankruptcy Act. See 1 Mooma, FEDERAL PAncTCE if 0.203[2], at
2120-21 (2d ed. 1959). Remission in that case did not cause delay or inconvenience to the
parties, however, since the disputed property continued to produce profits during the re-
mission and, in any event, the proceeds would not have been distributed before termination
of the reorganization proceeding, which would clearly outlast the state court suit on re-
mission.
101. The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588, 597 (1959) (concurring opinion of Frank-
furter, J., quoting Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 187 (1947)) ; see County of Alle-
gheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 190 (1959) ; Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326
U.S. 99, 108-09 (1945). See also Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the
Judicial Code, 13 LAw & CoNTEmp. PROB. 216, 238-39 (1948).
102. See Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472, 491-92 (1949).
103. If the state court adjudicates the federal constitutional question the only federal
review will be by the Supreme Court. See Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elec-
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Nor does a sufficient state interest exist which demands that state courts
have first opportunity to resolve doubtful issues of state law in all cases. A
repugnant federal reading of state law which, for example, nullifies state action
"close to the political interests of a state" can be readily disregarded by state
courts, so long as -that action also affects in-state parties who cannot remove
to a -federal forum. Of course, the federal-court decision may thus produce a
result inconsistent with subsequent state court determinations. But such in-
consistency would seem similar to that which may result whenever a foreign
forum interprets the state's law under conflict-of-laws rules. Furthermore, al-
though the federal judge is an "outsider" in diversity cases, the Judicial Code
assumes the necessity of federal courts making difficult state law determinations
in both diversity and nondiversity cases,104 and district judges are usually well-
schooled in the local law which they must daily apply.A05
But an initial reading of applicable law, later contradicted by state courts,
may temporarily thwart the state with respect to an important party-a power-
ful foreign corporation able to remove-and lead to a result akin to denial of
tions, 360 U.S. 45 (1959) ; Angel v. Bullington, '330 U.S. 183 (1947). If the state court
does not decide the federal constitutional issue, the suit will return to federal district court.
See Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. McLaughlin, 88 F. Supp. 711 (D. .Conn. 1949), re'vd,
181 F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 1950), rev'd, 340 U.S. 602 (1951). See also Government & CivIC
Employees 'Organizing Comm. v. Windsor, 353 U.S. 364, 366 (1957), in which the Supreme
Court ordered that the district court abstain (for the second time) from deciding con-
stitutional issues until the parties presented the state court with the relevant conduct that
would allow that court to interpret the applicable statute so that the district court would
have a -basis for making a decision on the constitutional issues. Compare Note, 59 CoLum.
L. REv. 749, 773 (1959).
104. See Kurland, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, The Suprenw Court and the Erie Doctrine
in Diversity Cases, 67 YALE L.J. 187, 212-13 (1957), stating that, while the problem of as-
certaining state law appears most frequently in diversity cases, it is not limited to those
cases but is "part of a larger problem of the twentieth century judicial emphasis on con-
flict of laws," quoting 'WYZANSI, A TRIAL JUDGES FRE DOM AND IREsPONSIILITY 23
(1952). Federal courts are constantly called upon to decide state law issues in federal ques-
tion cases, see, e.g., Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472 (1949), and may often be required to
ascertain difficult issues of law in states other than those in which they sit, see, e.g., Sutton
v. Leib, 342 U.S. 402 (1952).
105. The district judges are usually appointed from lawyers within the district, due
partly to "senatorial courtesy" which countenances following the recommendations of the
state senators especially if affiliated with the same political party as the President. See
Miller, Federal Judicial Appointments: The Continuing Struggle for Good Judges, 41
A.B.A.J. 125, 128 (1955). See also Louisiana 'Power & Light -Co. v. City of Thibodaux,
360 U.S. 25, 27 n.2 (1959) (uMr. Justice Frankfurter refers to the "experienced district
judge, especially conversant with Louisiana law") ; Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472, 486-87
(1949) ; Note, 59 CoLum. L. REv. 749, 760 (1959).
Since federal judges decide numerous eminent domain controversies in which the United
States is the condemnor moving against local landowners, they would seem to be less
"outsiders" than in cased presenting problems not within their special competence. See
[1957] U.S. JuDicrAL CONFmuEcE ANN. REP. PROcEMINGs 174 (in fiscal year 1956 the




equal protection vis-avis in-state parties. Even assuming that such results
override the congressional grant of diversity jurisdiction, 10° however, means
of curing such an inconsistency, less drastic than the preventative Thibodaux
procedure, would appear available to federal courts. As was the practice in
pre-Puslman constitutional cases, the federal court's final judgment could in-
dude a provision authorizing its reopening if a state court later renders an in-
consistent interpretation of state law.10 7 Alternatively, state officials could be
allowed to obtain relief under the broad terms of federal rule 60(b) (6),108
which permits relief from a final judgment at any time 10) for any reason justi-
•fying such relief.110 Employment of such devices should be carefully limited,
however, to cases raising important problems of federal-state relations-per-
haps to cases, like Thibodaux, in which state officials may be blocked in the
exercise of eminent domain or comparable state police or regulatory powers.
Such a limited exception to the general nonopenability of final order, which
would 'be operative only when the federal construction in fact became incon-
sistent, would seem preferable to the more generally applicable judicial limita-
tion on diversity jurisdiction suggested by Thibodaux.
On the other hand, the state interest in state-court interpretation of state
law would be considerable when the challenged action affects only out-of-state
parties, who could permanently avoid state adjudication through continued
106. Meredith may be viewed as holding that such considerations do not override the
diversity grant. See Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 234 (1943):
But we are of opinion that the difficulties of ascertaining what the state courts may
hereafter determine the state law to be do not in themselves afford a sufficient ground
for a federal court to decline to exercise its jurisdiction to decide a case which is
properly brought to it for a decision.
107. This procedure was employed in The Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352, 473
(1913), and was followed in Lee v. Bickell, 292 U.S. 415 (1934) ; Glenn v. Field Packing
Co., 290 U.S. 177 (1933). See also Wald Transfer & Storage Co. v. Smith, 290 U.S. 602
(1933) (federal decree denying an injunction). For a discussion of the procedure as an
alternative to the Pull,unt remission device, see Note, 54 HARv. L. Rsv. 1379 (1941).
108. See Fre. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (6) (".... the court may relieve a party... from a
final judgment, order, or proceeding for . . . any . . . reason justifying relief from the
operation of the judgment").
109. See United States v. Karahalias, 205 F.2d 331, 335 (2d Cir. 1953) (reversal of
district court denial of rule 60(b) (6) motion seventeen years after final judgment entered).
110. Rule 60(b) (6) "vests power in courts adequate to enable them to vacate judg-
ments whenever such action is appropriate to accomplish justice.. ." subject to the limita-
tions of the -preceding specific clauses. Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601b 614-15
(1949) (relief was granted under 60(b) (6) to petitioner who was denaturalized by de-
fault, without any proof, funds, or counsel). Compare Ackermann v. United States, 340
U.S. 193 (1950) (clause (6) cannot be used as a substitute for appeal) ; 7 Moonz, FEDMA.
PRAc-ricF. 60.27[2], at 301 (2d ed. 1955) (the purpose of this residual clause is ". . . to
cover unforeseen contingencies. . ." and to accomplish justice in "exceptional situations").
This broad purpose of the clause would seem to encompass a situation where a federal
court renders an interpretation of a state statute without any guidance from the authorita-
tive state court and the statute is later construed differently by the highest court of the
state.
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removal. In such a situation, which may well have been Jthe case in Thibodaux,
state courts would have no opportunity to reverse a federal interpretation of
state law which they think erroneous. Hence, the Thibodauxt procedure could
be limited to those cases in which it appears likely that a state-court construc-
tion could be permanently frustrated in this -fashion."1 ' Even when a federal
court could predict whether such frustration would in fact occur, however, the
state legislature would be free to override the -federal interpretation by statu-
tory enactments clarifying state policy. Once the state legislature has so acted,
res judicata would not bar a federal suit against the out-of-state party, which
would reverse the result previously reached. 1 2 In addition, diversity jurisdic-
tion's protection of out-of-state parties from local prejudice may be needed
most when the challenged action affects no in-state parties; perhaps, therefore,
state interests are outweighed by the congressional policy of providing a neu-
tral forum.
Although no attempt has here been made to evaluate the merits of diversity
jurisdiction, even those who disfavor such jurisdiction might nevertheless balk
at the Thibodau.v doctrine, outside the area just described in which state courts
would otherwise never -have an opportunity to decide the issues involved,113
because of its potential detriment to the smooth administration of justice. And,
for those who view diversity jurisdiction as offering procedural and other
advantages which should 'be preserved, that doctrine carries the rationale of
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins and federal abstention beyond a balanced federal posi-
tion; it denies congressional intent and constitutes unwarranted solicitude for
state interests.
111. Thibodaux would then be justified by one of the policy considerations underlying
Burford. See note 27 supra and accompanying text; American Airlines, Inc. v. Louisville
& Jefferson County Air Bd., 269 F.2d 811 (6th .Cir. 1959). American Airlines was a suit
brought by the Air Board in state court to obtain a declaratory judgment as to the validity
of its lease with the airlines, and removed to the federal district court solely on diversity
grounds. The district judge refused to remit the parties to the state courts and decided the
case on the merits. The airlines appealed to the court of appeals which reversed the dis-
trict court and stayed the federal proceeding while the parties obtained a declaratory judg-
ment in the Kentucky courts. Id. at 826-27. If the state courts were not given a prior op-
portunity to construe the applicable statutes, there probably would be no future litigation
with a domestic airline to interpret the statutes after a federal court decision.
112. Of course, other doctrines such as denial of due process or deprivation of "vested"
rights might prevent such action.
1.13. See text at note 111 supra.
